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The concept of a goal critically separates dynamic events 
involving humans from other events. Human behaviours are 
motivated by goals, which are known to the actor but 
typically inferred on the part of the observer. Goals can be 
hierarchical in nature, such that a collection of sub-goals 
(e.g., getting a mug, boiling water) can be nested under a 
higher-level goal (e.g., making tea), which can be further 
nested under an even higher-level goal (e.g., making 
breakfast). 
The diverse set of talks in this symposia all highlight the 
foundational role that goals play in action processing and 
representation. Eisenberg et al. detail how online prediction 
of others’ goals shapes observers’ sampling of information 
during action observation. Howard and Woodward provide 
evidence that children’s memory for non-human events can 
be facilitated by priming children with their own goal-
directed actions. Loucks and Meltzoff highlight the 
importance of goal structure in children’s memory for 
complex action sequences. Finally, Cooper presents a 
computational model to explain the emergence of goal-
directed action hierarchies. 
 
Eisenberg, Zacks, & Flores: Prediction Around 
Event Boundaries During Continuous Viewing 
of Naturalistic Activity 
The ability to break down ongoing activity into meaningful 
events is integral for comprehension and memory. We 
propose that this ability is driven by monitoring prediction 
error during perception. As people view ongoing activity, 
they maintain a model of the current event and use it to 
make predictions about what is going to happen next. When 
these predictions fail, viewers must update their event model 
to better capture the ongoing activity; this is experienced as 
a boundary between events. This proposed mechanism 
entails that prediction performance is worse at event 
boundaries than during the middles of events. 
Previous research has supported this hypothesis using an 
explicit prediction judgment task. Here, we tested the 
hypothesis that perceptual prediction fails at event 
boundaries using an implicit eye tracking measure. In a 
series of two studies, participants passively watched movies 
of actors completing everyday activities while their eyes 
were tracked using an eye-tracker. Participants then watched 
the movies again and identified the boundaries between 
meaningful units of activity. We hypothesized that 
participants would predictively look at the objects that the 
actor was about to touch during the few seconds before the 
actor contacted the objects. In addition, we hypothesized 
that participants would begin making predictive eye 
movements later in time when the object contact occurred 
close to an event boundary compared to when the object 
contact occurred within an event. The results provided 
support for both hypotheses. These results provide further 
evidence that prediction failures drive the subjective 
experience of an event boundary and suggest a novel and 
naturalistic method for studying prediction during 
comprehension of ongoing activity. 
 
Howard & Woodward: The Effect of Action 
Priming on Children’s Event Memory 
Research has demonstrated that the mere inclusion of a 
person in an event boosts children’s memory (Howard & 
Woodward, under review). However, the mechanism 
underlying this effect has yet to be explored. One possibility 
is that the presence of a person primes children to think of 
discrete sequential steps as part of a higher-level goal, 
providing a structure that increases later recall. In fact, we 
know that even infants spontaneously segment events 
according to goals, and in adults segmentation according to 
goals relates to better event memory. 
We explored whether priming children to think of goal-
directed actions before encoding an event can improve 
sequential memory. Three-year-old children played either an 
action game (Action Priming) or sticker game (Control 
Priming) with a series of novel toys. Participants then 
watched two picture sequences on a Tobii eye-tracking 
monitor, each culminating in the creation of an object. Half 
of the children saw object pieces assembled by a person 
(Person condition) while half saw the pieces assembled 
without a person present (No-person condition). After a 
delay, children were given the pieces and asked to 
reconstruct the sequence from memory. Our hypotheses 
were that only action priming would facilitate recall in the 
No-person condition, and that there would be no benefit of 
either priming in the Person condition. 
Results demonstrated that children in the Person condition 
remembered the same number of event steps regardless of 
priming. In contrast, children in the No-Person/Action 
group remembered significantly more steps than those in the 
No-Person/Control group, suggesting that action priming 
can increase memory for non-social events. These results 
suggest that early learning is strengthened by the goal 
structures inherently provided by social partners, and that 
framing even non-social events in terms of higher-level 
goals can increase later recall. 
 
Loucks & Meltzoff: Higher-Level Goals 
Structure Children’s Action Memory 
Multitasking is a common occurrence in action. For 
example, one might be preparing breakfast at the same time 
as packing one’s briefcase, flitting between these higher-
level goals with the completion of individual sub-goals. 
Such events pose an unexplored representational problem 
for the observer: should the representation prioritize 
veridical sequential structure, at the cost of representing 
higher-level goals, or should it prioritize goals, at a similar 
cost to sequential structure? This representational problem 
may be significant for young observers, who are rapidly 
acquiring action goals. We previously used a deferred 
imitation task to demonstrate that three-year-old children’s 
memory for familiar interleaved goals prioritizes goal 
organization over sequential organization (Loucks & 
Meltzoff, 2013). 
 In the current research, we more directly observed goal 
organization by manipulating children’s exposure to higher-
level goal information in two studies. In Study 1, children in 
the experimental group learned about a novel goal A on day 
1, while children in the control group learned an unrelated 
novel goal (B). On day 2, all children were shown an 
interleaved event involving two goals – goal A and goal X – 
and then given a chance to imitate. Only experimental 
children organized their imitation according to higher-level 
goals, and also remembered significantly more actions 
overall. Study 2 demonstrated that prior goal knowledge 
also structures children’s memory when it is gained in the 
form of a picture book on day 1. 
We believe these results highlight both the early 
emergence and the benefit of goal prioritization in 
children’s memory for others’ action, and underscore the 
importance of this representation problem for theories of 
action representation. 
 
Cooper: On the Acquisition of Goal 
Hierarchies: A Computational Model 
Methods based on reinforcement learning, and in particular 
temporal difference learning, have proven to be highly 
effective in developing agents that can learn to perform 
goal-directed sequential behaviors. The direct application of 
such methods, however, can learn to achieve only one goal, 
and that goal must be known in advance (so that 
reinforcement can be provided when it is achieved). Thus, 
the classical approach does not address the questions of 
where goals come from or how goals inter-relate. I will 
consider these questions from the perspective of the 
contention scheduling model of routine action selection 
(Cooper & Shallice, 2000), which assumes that action 
sequences reflect the selection and execution of 
hierarchically organized goal-directed action schemas. 
I will extend the existing model to action acquisition, 
showing how a set of action primitives may become 
associated with feature-based object representations through 
exploration, exploitation and habituation. Representations of 
action primitives and of objects form separate but connected 
interactive activation networks. Through experience, objects 
with similar action-related features come to trigger actions 
appropriate to those objects, and vice versa. It is further 
assumed that actions with “interesting” consequences (i.e., 
that lead to reliable changes to the world) are reified into 
schemas, which may themselves be invoked to achieve 
specific ends. Successive application of this approach 
results, after sufficient toying within a domain, in the 
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